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Abstract 
Theories of equity and distributive justice suggest that actors will use 
legitimate distribution rules as a basis for actions designed to maintain or 
restore equity. However, those theories do not consider the possibility that 
conflicting but equally legitimate distribution rules may apply to a given 
situation. Recent developments in the study of legitimation processes imply 
that distribution rules can be either valid (legitimated by the collectivity 
or its agents) or proper (legitimated by a focal actor). Both forms of 
legitimation are presumed to have powerful effects on behavior. This study 
examines the behavior of third-party allocators when the validity and 
propriety of distribution rules varies. The findings indicate that although 
both forms of legitimation have significant effects on allocative behavior * 
the effects of validity are more powerful. 
Theory and research on equity and distributive justice has generally 
focused on either or both of two important issues. One line of research is 
concerned with individual and collective responses to injustice. It has been 
argued that individuals experience tension or distress as a result of relative 
deprivation (Merton and Rossi; Stouffer et al.), cognitive dissonance or 
imbalance (Adams, a; Alexander and Simpson) or inequitable exchanges (Adams, 
b; Homans; Walster et al.), and given the existence of distress, individuals 
act to establish equity. A number of empirical investigations, have examined 
the kinds of actions individuals take to establish or maintain equity and the 
conditions under which such actions are taken. 
A second line of work has sought to specify the conditions under which 
situations are defined as equitable or inequitable. It has been argued that 
conceptions of justice are formed on the basis of comparisons of inputs and 
outcomes associated with self and others in exchange (e.g., Adams, b; Homans; 
Walster et al.), comparisons with existing systems of values and norms 
regulating exchange (Blau), or comparisons with a general social type, group, 
or category of actors (Berger et al.; Zelditch et al.). 
There is considerable disagreement about the nature of individual 
conceptions of equity. Homans has argued that actors evaluate the justness of 
an exchange cn the basis of a simple rule of proportionality. Other theorists 
agree that a principle of proportionality is used but disagree on its 
empirical form (Adams, a; Austin and Walster; Harris; Walster et al.). Much 
of the early work on equity processes focused on pay equity (Adams and 
Jacobsen; Lawler) but issues of equity are also associated with the 
distribution of other socially valued rewards. Status-value theorists (Berger 
et al.; Zelditch et al.) suggest that a determination of justice is the 
outcome of a complex comparison process which includes comparisons with 
specific individuals (local comparisons) and collectivities of actors 
(referential comparisons). Some theorists suggest that factors not related to 
pay are important to a determination of pay-equity and result in the 
activation of an equality standard (Jasso; Leventhal and Anderson).
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No matter how equity is defined, there is general agreement that 
individuals will act to restore or maintain justice when standards of equity 
are violated or threatened. Cook has argued that distribution rules are 
important to the activation of equity processes. Distribution rules specify 
the relationship between dimensions of evaluation (inputs) and the outcomes or 
rewards which are allocated. Once a distribution rule is established, 
behavior is generally assumed to be nonproblematic. That is, actors are 
expected to use the rule as a basis for actions which create or maintain 
equity. 
An important scope restriction on Cook's formulation is the requirement 
that the focal actor (the actor whose responses to equity or inequity are of 
central concern) perceive the relevant distribution rule as legitimate or 
appropriate. In this context it is argued that there are two general typas. of 
inequitable systems: First, there are systems in which a legitimate 
distribution rule is applied in an inequitable fashion. Second there are 
situations in which an existing distribution rule is defined as illegitimate 
(cf. Cook and Parcel). But legitimation is a complex process which may have 
independent effects on equity processes. There are several objects of 
legitimation, e.g., persons, positions and actions (Walker et al.; Zelditch 
and Walker), and the legitimacy of each can be evaluated from the perspective 
of one or more of three sources of legitimacy—the focal actor, peers of the 
focal actor, or persons to whom the focal actor is subordinate. 
Equity standards which are legitimated by a focal actor are said to 
possess propriety, i.e, they are believed to represent desirable models of 
action or to be appropriate. The effects of propriety are generally limited 
to direct effects on the behavior of the actor who holds the beliefs. 
Propriety can be contrasted with legitimation through validation.
e
 A standard 
of behavior is legitimated through validation if it is believed to be binding 
on all the members of a relevant collectivity (Dornbusch and Scott; Weber). 
Validation is established through the collective support of rules and norms by 
peers of the focal actor (endorsement) or by superordinate agents of the 
collectivity (authorization). 
Cook's requirement that distribution rules possess legitimacy raises an 
interesting set of issues. Theories of legitimacy generally suggest that 
actors are more likely to engage in behavior which is legitimate "than behavior 
which is not legitimate. Hence, actors should be more likely to engage in 
actions which are consistent with a legitimate distribution rule—actions 
which serve to establi&h or maintain equity—than actions which are 
inconsistent with such a rule, or those which are consistent with an 
illegitimate distribution rule. Theories of equity and distributive justice 
are generally consistent with legitimacy theories in such instances. But 
equity theories are silent on the issue of how actors will behave when 
conflicting but equally legitimate standards of equity exist. This article 
examines the behavioral implications of competing distribution rules when one 
rule possesses propriety and the other is valid. Legitimation theory is used 
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to construct several hypotheses which are tested with experimental data on 
third-party allocations. 
Legitimacy and Equity; Theory 
Cook (and see Cook and Parcel) has argued that legitimate distribution 
rules are important to the activation of equity processes. Behavior is 
relatively nonproblematic given the existence of a legitimate distribution 
rule. But the legitimacy of social objects can be evaluated from at least 
three different perspectives, all of which have implications for the actions 
of individuals and groups. A given distribution rule may be proper or 
improper, endorsed or unendorsed, or authorized or not authorized. Behavior 
would appear to be unproblematic when characterizations of the three sources 
of legitimation are consistent, e.g., when a rule is proper, endorsed and 
authorized, or when consistency is implied due to the silence of one or more 
sources of legitimation. The latter case is illustrated by situations in 
which an actor believes a distribution rule is legitimate (the rule possesses 
propriety) and has no information about endorsement or authorization. But 
behavior is problematic when there are conflicting evaluations of the same 
rule, e.g., when a rule is authorized by superordinate agents of the 
collectivity but rejected by peers of the focal actor, or when competing 
standards are legitimated. Equity theories have not addressed this issue and 
as a consequence, relatively little evidence has been brought to bear on it.
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While it is not entirely clear how the various sources and objects of 
legitimacy are related (Walker et al.; Zelditch and Walker), there appear to 
be fundamental differences in the behavioral implications of propriety and 
validity. Propriety has its principal effects on the behavior of the focal 
actor, i.e., the actor who believes that some social object possesses 
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legitimacy. On the other hand, validity appears to have both direct and 
indirect effects on behavior. It has been demonstrated that endorsement has 
significant effects on the behavior of high-status actors (Michener and Burt), 
and on the likelihood that subordinate actors will initiate social change 
(Walker et al.). A substantial amount of the endorsement effect appears to be 
mediated through propriety. Similarly, (Thomas et al.) have demonstrated that 
authorization has important effects on the suppression of social change and 
<Walker and Zelditch) demonstrate that while both propriety and validity 
(authorization) have significant effects on the behavior of supervisory 
personnel, only validity has important effects on the likelihood that powerful 
actors will impose sanctions on their subordinates. The available literature 
seems to suggest that validity is the more powerful agent of social control. 
And the strength of validity appears to be derived from its collective (as 
against individual) origins. These findings suggest that, given the choice 
between proper and valid distribution rules, actors will more often utilize 
collective <vaiid> standards to assess equity. These basic ideas about the 
differential effects Df proper and valid standards of equity are tested using 
laboratory data on third-party allocations in the rte*t section, of ttrts papar. 
Method 
Subjects in this investigation were eighty-three male undergraduates who 
volunteered to participate in a sociology experiment. Volunteers were 
promised that they would be paid for participating in the study, although they 
were not told how much they would earn. All participants passed an initial 
screening designed to eliminate those who had been involved in other 
laboratory investigations which employed deceptions. Responses of an 
additional eighteen subjects who were suspicious or failed to understand 
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procedures are not included in the analyses reported below. 
Procedures 
When they arrived at the laboratory, subjects were individually escorted 
from a reception area to the study area. They each drew a colored token from 
an urn and were told that their choice designated them as a "supervisor." (In 
reality all subjects were suoervisors.) Each subject was seated in a 
soundproofed room which was equipped with a desk, chair, audio speaker, 
signalling device and a variety of message slips, and told to await further 
instructions. All subjects in a laboratory run received detailed audio-taped 
instructions simultaneously. 
The investigation was presented as a study of the effectiveness of 
various communications systems in groups whose members could not engage in 
face-to-face interaction. Subjects were told that they would be supervising 
two five-person work teams, the "Blue" and "Red" teams. Individual members of 
the fictitious teams were designated by the letters A-E. Experimental 
subjects were told that their principal duties were to supervise team 
organization, evaluate the performances of teams and of individual team 
members and to pay each member of both teams at specified intervals. 
The subjects were told that the teams they were supervising would work an 
identical series of ten graph-construction problems (see Walker et al. and 
Zelditch and Walker for a more complete description of the basic task). At 
the beginning of each problem every member of both teams had some information 
(a set of points and lines) necessary to construct a five-point, multiline 
graph. Team members had to exchange information among themselves in order to 
solve the graphs and they did so by exchanging written messages using 
standardized message forms. Team members were to send their answers to their 
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supervisors after they had solved the graph. An experimental trial was 
completed when a supervisor had received an answer from each member of the two 
teams he supervised. 
Each supervisor was instructed to compare the answers he received from 
team members to answers from a master answer sheet. The supervisors noted the 
team member who had sent the answer, the team to which he belonged (whether 
Blue or Red) and whether his answer was correct or incorrect. After the 
supervisor received answers from all members of a team, he was required to 
determine the number of correct answers, calculate the amount the team had 
earned (at a rate of $.50 for each correct answer) and to send the results to 
team member C. Team earnings were to be pooled because teamwork was necessary 
for any member of a team to get the correct answer and supervisors were told 
that they would pay team members from the pooled earnings. 
Team memder C was the only person permitted to send messages (other than 
answers) to the supervisor. On each trial, the supervisor received an 
"Allocation Request" from member C on both teams. The request indicated a 
suggested pay distribution for the money earned on the trial just completed. 
The supervisors were instructed that they had the authority to make all final 
pay decisions and that they could either accept or reject C's requests. After 
a supervisor made his final pay decisions, he recorded the amount each team 
member was to receive on a pay sheet and team members were told to begin work 
on the next problem. 
The supervisors and their "teams" worked a practice problem during which 
answers were transmitted and checked and requests for pay were made and 
approved or rejected. Supervisors completed an evaluation of the teams and of 
individual team members after the practice problem had been completed. The 
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supervisors were told that this unofficial evaluation was designed to prepare 
them for the actual evaluations which would be made after five problems had 
been completed. The evaluation form used in the informal evaluation was 
identical in every way to the form used after the fifth problem was completed. 
After the informal evaluation was completed, the instructions were summarized* 
the supervisors were reminded to record their allocation decisions on the pay 
sheets because they would be asked to write checks to team members after the 
fifth problem was completed? and subjects began the five criterion trials.** 
After the fifth problem was completed, supervisors evaluated each of the 
teams, paid each team member from the cumulative earnings and the study was 
stopped. At this point, experimental subjects were interviewed, debriefed and 
paid for their participation. 
The supervisors received answers from team members and received pay 
requests from member C of each team during each of the five trials. All 
answers were standardized so that they were always correct, the order in which 
team members sent answers to the supervisors was controlled by experimental 
assistants so that no team member "outperformed" other team members, and 
neither team performed significantly faster than the other.
3
 Only the 
requests for pay were permitted to vary. Each team earned $2.50 on each of 
the criterion trials. Member C on the Blue team always requested $.50 for 
himself and for each of his coworkers (pay equality). In contrast, member C on 
the Red team always requested $.70 for himself and $.45 for each of the other 
team members (pay inequality). 
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Experimental Manipulations: Creating Proper and Valid Distribution Rules 
It is important that valid and proper standards exist in order to test 
arguments about their relative effects on allocative behavior. Two 
experimental procedures were introduced to establish valid and proper 
distribution rules. Standards of propriety were established by varying the 
work structures to which teams were assigned. The supervisors were told that 
the teams they were supervising were using either a Bavelas "wheel" structure 
or an all-to-all structure. The central figure (team member C) must handle 
four times as many messages as any of the other team members in order to 
accomplish complete information interchange in the wheel structure. It was 
assumed that supervisors would apply the principle of proportionality (Homans) 
and believe that team member C was entitled to more pay than his coworkers 
under such conditions. Supervisors who adopted this position were classified 
as having adopted an inequality standard of equity. 
When teams are assigned to the all-to-all network every team member can 
communicate with every other member and hypothetically all team members handle 
an equal number of messages. Under such conditions, it was assumed that 
supervisors—again assuming they applied the rule of proportionality—would 
adopt the position that all team members should receive the same pay. When a 
supervisor believed that team members should receive equal pay, he was 
classified as having adopted an equa1i ty standard of equity. 
A valid distribution rule was established through authorization, i.e., by 
varying what was authorized by the host experimenter. Depending upon the 
experimental treatment to which they were assigned, supervisors were told that 
there was an allocation rule which required them to pay all team members 
equally or they were given no information about how to allocate earnings to 
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team members. Supervisors who were exposed to the directive were operating 
under a valid standard of equality while those who were not exposed to the 
directive were classified as operating under conditions of nonvalidity. As a 
result of these two proceduresj experimental subjects are distributed across 
four experimental treatments. In treatment 1, subjects believe pay should be 
divided equally and this (proper) rule is also valid. In treatment 2 the 
equality rule is proper but nonvalid. In treatment 3, supervisors believe 
that C should receive more pay than his coworkers and this inequality standard 
is proper but invalid. Finally, supervisors in treatment h believe that an 
inequality rule is proper but such a rule is nonvalid.* The distribution of 
subjects by experimental treatment is displayed in Table 1. 
Table 1 about here 
Dependent Variable and Hypotheses 
The effects which proper and valid distribution rules have on the amounts 
of pay which supervisors award to the members of the teams they supervise is 
the principal concern of this research. Supervisors were informed that they 
were to make all final decisions about pay, and technically, a supervisor 
could award all earnings to one individual, or impose any distribution plan he 
desired. But it was anticipated that concerns about equity would determine 
the actual distributions of rewards. If supervisors believed that team 
members should be paid equally, all team members (including team member C) 
should earn approximately $2.50 over five trials. On the other hand, if 
supervisors believed that it was equitable for team members to be paid 
unequally, team member C should receive greater rewards than his coworkers. 
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The dependent variable is the total amount (in dollars) paid to team member C 
over the five criterion trials. 
The arguments advanced here suggest that supervisors will pay team member 
C an equitable wage. But the research design introduces variation in the 
propriety of distribution rules—whether a supervisor adopts an equality or 
equity standard—and in their validity. When an equality standard is 
activated supervisors should experience pressure to make team member C's 
earnings approximate the earnings of his coworkers—he should receive about 
$2.50 over the five trials. On the other hand, it is expected that 
supervisors will pay team member C significantly more than $2.50 when 
inequality is the legitimate standard of equity. Hypothesis I is a formal 
statement of that belief. 
Hypothesis 1; Supervisors who adopt an inequality standard of 
equity award higher earnings to team member C than 
supervisors who adopt an equality standard of equity. 
By the same reasoning, supervisors should feel pressure to make team 
member C's earnings approximate those of his coworkers when there is a valid 
standard which specifies equality. That is, when equality is validated 
supervisors should feel constrained to create equality no matter what there 
personal standards of equity are. It is expected that propriety will 
determine the nature of allocations in the absence of valid equity standards. 
As a result team member C should have higher earnings under the nonvalidity 
condition than under the valid (equality) condition. Hypothesis 2 is a formal 
statement of the prediction regarding the effects of validity. 
Hypothesis 2; Supervisors award higher earnings to team member C in 
the absence of a valid standard than they do when 
there is a valid standard specifying equality. 
Study condition 2 is the treatment in which there is a valid distribution 
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rule specifying equality while the supervisors are expected to believe that 
earnings should be divided unequally. Treatment 2 permits an examination of 
the issue which is central to this paper: How is equity determined when 
proper and valid standards of equity conflict? Legitimacy theory and findings 
from some related work (Walker and Zelditch) suggests that validity should 
have the more powerful effects on behavior. Hence, it is expected that the 
valid standard of equity (equality) will have greater influence on the 
al locative behavior of supervisors than their own sense of propriety when the 
two standards conflict. Such an effect should be represented by an 
"interaction effect." That is, there should be relatively little difference 
in the responses of supervisors who adopt equality standards when validity of 
standards is varied but substantial differences in the responses of 
supervisors who adopt inequality standards when validity is varied. 
Hypothesis 3 is a statement of the expected effect. 
Hypothesis 3: Supervisors who adopt an inequality standard of 
equity award higher earnings to team member C under 
the nonvalidity treatment than under the validity 
treatment. Supervisors in the validity and 
nonvalidity treatments who adopt an equality standard 
of equity make similar allocations to team member C. 
Two categorical variables were constructed as the operational measures of 
propriety and validity and were used to examine the effects of variation in 
the propriety and validity of distribution rules on the rewards allocated to 
team member C, EARNINGS. PROPRIETY takes a value of 0 when equality is the 
proper standard of equity and 1 when inequality is the equitable distribution 
rule. VALIDITY takes a value of 0 when there is a valid distribution rule 
specifying equality of allocations to team members and 1 when there is no 
valid distribution rule. 
Two sets of findings are discussed below. The first set of findings 
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provides checks on the success of the attempts to create experimental 
variation in propriety and validity. The second set of findings are the data 
which bring evidence to bear on the hypotheses. The checks on the success of 
experimental manipulations utilizes data taken from the responses to the two 
questionnaires administered during the study and from the post-session 
interview. 
Analytic Procedures 
The principal hypotheses suggest an analysis of variance model with main 
effects of PROPRIETY and VALIDITY and a PROPRIETY X VALIDITY interaction. 
However, the design is unbalanced due to unequal cell frequencies (see Table 
1). As a consequence, the data are analyzed using the GLM procedure (SAS). 
The GLM procedure uses least squares methods to fit general linear models and 
is suitable for fitting ANOVA models with unbalanced designs. Output from the 
GLM procedure includes values of the F-ratio for the hypothesized model, and 
for each of the design variables in the model. 
Results 
The investigation used two experimental procedures to establish validity 
and propriety. Validity was created by authorization, i.e., the host 
experimenter told the subjects that there was a rule which required them to 
pay all subjects an equal share of the earnings. Validity was assumed if 
subjects heard the rule which prescribed the allocation of equal payments to 
team members. The responses of all participants who indicated to the 
interviewer that they had not heard the rule when it was given or who heard it 
and chose not to believe it were eliminated from the analysis.
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 Subjects who 
were exposed to the rule are assumed to be operating 
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under conditions of validity while subjects who were not exposed to the rule 
were in the nonvalid condition. 
One of the items on the questionnaire which was administered after the 
practice trial asked subjects to indicate whether they believed team earnings 
should be divided equally or unequally. Subjects responded to the question 
using a five-point scale on which 1 indicates a strong feeling that earnings 
should be divided unequally and 5 indicates a strong feeling that earnings 
should be divided equally. The response categories were collapsed and it is 
assumed that subjects who marked either 1 or 2 on the scale had adopted an 
inequality standard of equity and subjects who marked 4 or 5 had adopted an 
equality standard. Data for nine persons who were indifferent are not 
included in the analyses which follow. 
Table 2 about here 
The data in Table 2 are the mean earnings awarded to team member C by 
experimental treatment. An examination of the row means suggests that 
supervisors who believe that team members should receive unequal allocations 
award more money to team member C ($2.96) than supervisors who believe that 
team members should receive equal allocations ($2.^9). Similarly, supervisors 
who are not constrained by a valid distribution rule award more earnings to 
team member C ($2.79) than supervisors who are given a valid rule ($2.62). 
The highest awards are made to team member C when there is no valid rule and 
the supervisors believe that earnings should be unequal. Under those 
conditions C receives an average of $3.10. But C's earnings fall to an 
average of $2.72 when there is a valid standard of payment. It is also clear 
that a valid rule affects the allocations to team member C when the 
supervisors believe that team members should receive equal payments. Under 
that condition, team member C receives an average of $2.54 when there is a 
distribution rule which specifies equality of payment. But team member C's 
earnings fall to an average of only $2.44 in the absence of a valid rule. 
Table 3 about here 
The data in Table 3 are the results of the ANOVA on team member C's 
earnings. The findings support the general model <F = 26.72, p = .0001). 
There are significant main effects of PROPRIETY (F = 54.19, p = .0001) and 
VALIDITY (F = 7.70, p = .0063) and a significant PROPRIETY X VALIDITY 
interaction (F = 19.73, p = .0001). These results are consistent with 
Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3.® 
Discussion and Summary 
It has been argued that legitimate distribution rules are necessary for 
the activation of equity processes (Cook). But legitimation is a complex 
process and it is oossible that multiple standards of legitimacy exist in many 
social situations. Equity theory is generally silent on the nature of social 
action when two equally legitimate distribution rules imply conflicting 
behavior. Legitimacy theories suggest that both validity and propriety have 
powerful effects on behavior. They imply that propriety will determine the 
course of behavior in the absence of valid standards. But when valid 
standards exist in conflict with proper standards, valid, i.e., collective, 
standards should have the more powerful effects on behavior. 
This paper has used data on third-party allocations to ideas about the 
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separate and joint effects of propriety and validity on behavior. The basic 
findings suggest that, as predicted by legitimacy theory, both proper and 
valid distribution rules have powerful effects on behavior. In addition, 
there is a significant PROPRIETY X VALIDITY interaction. Third parties make 
allocations which are more similar to those prescribed by the valid standard 
than those prescribed by a proper standard when the two standards conflict. 
The results are entirely consistent with theories of legitimacy and are useful 
in explaining Sell and Martin's findings in which actors failed to comply with 
legitimate distribution rules. These findings suggest that the investigators 
actually created conflicting distribution rules and the effects of a 
legitimate (endorsed) distribution rule dampened the effects of the rule 
established (authorized) by the experimenters. 
The findings reported here are also informative for research on 
collective mobilization. One of the fundamental anomalies in the literature 
on collective behavior is that persons who by all objective standards appear 
to be unjustly treated, often fail to mobilize in order to restore or 
establish a just distribution of scarce goods. It has been argued that the 
failure of disadvantaged group members to act in ways designed to establish or 
restore justice is due to false consciousness (Marx), their low 
self-evaluations (Delia Fave; Stolte), or the rational calculation of 
differences in the utilities of individual and collective goods (Olson). 
The findings reported here are entirely consistent with the view that 
collective standards of legitimacy significantly affect the behavior of actors 
in social relationships (Bachrach and Baratz). Although this research focuses 
on superordinate actors, the findings demonstrate that actors are more likely 
to use collective standards of legitimacy rather than their own standards when 
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the two conflict. In order for persons to actively pursue actions to 
establish justice, they must first recognize injustice (by employing their 
own, i.e., or proper distribution rules). But when the existing distribution 
of scarce rewards is legitimated, they must act in opposition to valid 
(collective) standards of legitimacy. This research suggests that 
justice-restoring behavior is problematic under such conditions. Hence, this 
research has implications for research on collective responses to injustice as 
well as having immediate implications for the understanding of responses of 
individuals to conflicting standards of equity. 
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NOTES 
1. Although "equality" standards are often contrasted with "equity" 
standards, it is more meaningful to frame the issue in terms of competing 
standards of equity. From this perspective an "equality" standard is one 
which specifies a uniform distribution of valued rewards among relevant 
actors. In contrast, an "equity" standard is a standard which specifies an 
unequal distribution of rewards. Although either standard can be defined as 
equitable, standards which specify proportional distributions of rewards, 
e.g., meritocratic standards based on quality or quantity of performances, are 
used more often in developed Western societies. 
2. In general, the use of the terms propriety, validity, endorsement and 
authorization is consistent with that of Dornbusch and Scott. Minor 
differences in usage are discussed elsewhere (Walker et al.; 2elditch and 
Walker) and readers are referred to those sources for a more complete 
discussion of the concepts. 
3. A recent paper by Sell and Martin might be considered an exception. 
Although the investigators were concerned with the conditions under which 
experimental subjects fail to comply with legitimate distribution rules, their 
establishment of group consensus can be considered a form of legitimation (of 
an alternate rule) by endorsement. In their study, two legitimate rules, one 
authorized and the other endorsed, always represented competing definitions of 
equity. Under such conditions (and without information on propriety) 
legitimacy theories would predict that endorsement would act to dampen the 
effects of authorization and the general finding of significant noncompliance 
with the authorized rule is consistent with a legitimation argument. There 
are also important differences in rates of noncompliance which may be due to 
differences in responses to particular combinations of rules which are 
endorsed and authorized or to differences in propriety. 
Supervisors were led to believe that the teams would work ten problems but 
no experimental run exceeded five trials. They were told that their teams 
would complete ten trials in order to create the possibility that they could 
sanction team members prior to beginning the second set of five trials. Data 
on sanctioning behavior have been analyzed in a separate paper (Walker and 
Zelditch). 
5. It might be argued that "perfect" scores would arouse suspicion but even 
though the problems appear to be complex upon initial examination, they are 
relatively simple and in our experience with subjects who actually work the 
problems mistakes are rare. In addition, none of the subjects who were 
eliminated due to suspicion were suspicious of the pattern of correct answers. 
6. There are important distinctions between invalidity and nonvalidity. An 
action is invalid if it is inconsistent with a valid standard. Under such 
conditions, all other things equal, actors should abandon the invalid behavior 
and use the valid standard as a basis for action. But when there are no valid 
standards an actor must rely on some other basis for acting, e.g., his or her 
own sense of propriety. As a consequence, there should be important 
differences in the responses of actors whose own standards of behavior are 
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invalid and those of actors holding similar standards which are nonvalid. 
7. Of the eighteen subjects whose responses were initially eliminated from V 
the analysis, ten were dropped from the treatment in which teams were assigned 
to the wheel structure and supervisors were given a valid rule (treatment 2). 
This is a generally unacceptable rate of suspicion for experimental research. 
The investigator retains confidence in the design due to the manner in which 
subjects were eliminated in this treatment. The majority of the respondents 
who were eliminated indicated that they had heard the rule but chose to ignore 
it. They indicated that they ignored the instruction because it seemed^* ^ 
illogical to pay all team members equally when it was clear that C did more 
work. The subjects were not "suspicious" in the conventional sense and their 
overall responses are similar to subjects who were not given a rule. The 
combined suspicion rate for subjects in the other three treatments is 13.1 
percent. 
8. The mean earnings under treatment 2 are unexpected and somewhat puzzling 
on first inspection. However, they are easily explained in the context of the 
overall research design. Team member C on the Red teams always requested that 
he be paid more than his coworkers and, even though other means of sanctioning 
were available to them (see Walker and Zelditch for a discussion of 
differences in sanctioning for violations of propriety and validity), some 
supervisors "punished" them by awarding them lower earnings than other team 
members. The mean pay of Red C's is $2.34 in this treatment. The average pay 
for Blue C's in this condition is $2.53, an amount which varies little from 
the mean earnings in cell 1 (Blue and Red C's receive $2.55 and $2.54 
respectively in that treatment). 
A separate analysis with an added categorical variable, C's team 
membership (TEAM), was conducted with this finding in mind. The results of 
that analysis indicate a substantial PROPRIETY X TEAM interaction which falls 
just short of statistical significance (F = 3.76, p = .06). Although adding 
the team membership variable helps to account for the unexpected finding in 
cell two, it does not alter the substantive interpretation of the findings. 
There is no main effect of team membership and none of the other interactions 
in this expanded model approach statistical significance. 
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Table 1. DISTRIBUTION OF SUBJECTS BY STUDY CONDITION. 
VALIDITY 
PROPRIETY Valid Rule No Valid Rule 
Equality Rule S2 19 
Inequality Rule 16 17 
24 
Table 2. MEAN EARNINGS (IN DOLLARS) OF TEAM MEMBER C BY STUDY CONDITION. 
PROPRIETY Valid Rule 
Equality Rule 2.54 
Inequality Rule 2.72 
Column Means 2.62 
VALIDITY 
No Valid Rule Row Means 
2.44 2.49 
3.18 2.96 
2.79 
25 
Table 3. ANOVA: TEAM 
DISTRIBUTION 
MEMBER C 
RULES 
'S EARNINGS BY VALIDITY AND PROPRIETY OF 
SOURCE DF SUM OF SQUARES MEAN SQUARE F P 
MODEL 3 11.62 3.87 26.72 .0001 
ERROR 144 20.87 .15 
PROPRIETY (A) 1 7.86 7.86 54.19 .0001 
VALIDITY (B) 1 1.12 1.12 7.70 .0063 
A x B 1 2.86 2.86 19.73 .0001 
